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1. Introduction  
 
1.1 The Radicalization Hypothesis 
Radicalization hypothesizes four outcomes: “terrorism”, “extremism”, “both” or “neither”. 
Whether the process takes a religious, ethnic or nationalist form and results in antisocial 
                                                 
1 Corresponding Author Contact: Ken Reidy, Email: kenneth.reidy@northumbria.ac.uk, Department of Social 
Sciences, Newcastle Upon Tyne, NE1 8ST, UK 
Abstract 
Successful radicalization posits three outcomes: extremism, terrorism or both. As these 
are undesirable, radicalization is understood as wholly malevolent and governments 
work to prevent and/or stop it. Nonetheless, a handful of scholars have recognized that 
the same radicalization process which results in either outcome may, theoretically at 
least, also have beneficial outcomes such as environmental awareness or human rights. 
This article explores one such outcome. Based on interviews with British Muslim aid 
workers (n=6) operating in Jihadist conflict zones post Arab spring and using 
constructivist grounded theory, it illustrates how the research participants radicalized 
to humanitarianism which resulted in them assisting the most plighted of Muslims by 
deploying to the most wanton of areas: ones commonly referred to as Jihadist conflict 
zones. Evidently, these destinations are shared with Jihadists and given the array of 
other observable similarities (socio-demographics and [pre-]mobilization behaviours), 
these morally opposed groups become conflated by the security services. This is 
further compounded by the fact that Jihadists manipulate and/or impersonate aid 
workers so as to funnel people and funds. To distinguish both, this article documents 
the benevolent pathway of the research participants and juxtaposes it to scholarly 
knowledge on Jihadist pathways. Socialization was revealed to be the key 
distinguishing feature rather than descriptive risk factors (such as ideology or moral 
outrage) because the process of radicalization was not found to be the start of the 
radicalized pathway. It concludes that benevolently radicalized Islamic groups 
constitute an effective means of pathway divergence for particular typologies by 
offering an attractive and prosocial alternative to Jihadism. This strengths-based 
preventative approach (“what’s right”) takes the form of a community-centric market 
competitor to Jihadism rather than a problem-based approach (“what’s wrong”) which 
only targets those at risk, but inadvertently tars the whole community in the process.  
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attitudes or political violence, successful radicalization is always considered malevolent. 
Were any non-terrorism and/or non-extremism outcome(s) to result from the process, said 
outcomes(s) would be subsumed into the “neither” category because, per the hypothesized 
outcomes, it would definitionally constitute “neither” terrorism nor extremism. The problem 
is, this “neither” category is implied to mean “no result” because the only actionable 
outcomes radicalization concedes to are “terrorism” and/or “extremism”. Subsequently, the 
existence of any outcomes outside of the terrorism and/or extremism are imperceptible to 
those researching radicalization and, should they be found to exist, this would imply a 
fragmentary understanding of the concept.  
 While attempting to discern violent from non-violent extremism under conditions of 
identical socio-demographics and geographic mobilization (see section 3), the doctoral 
dissertation this article is based on stumbled upon just such a “neither” outcome which was 
not merely “no result”, but a wholly benevolent one in the form of humanitarianism. In other 
words, research participants radicalized to high-risk aid work in Jihadist conflict zones (see 
sections 2.2 and 2.7). However, benevolent outcomes are fundamentally at odds with 
contemporary understandings of radicalization, so substantial changes were made to the 
fledgling research agenda and the concept of radicalization was expanded upon so as to 
incorporate benevolence as a potential outcome (see section 2.7). This resulted in the article’s 
research question: how does one mobilize to Jihadist conflict zones in a benevolent rather 
than a malevolent manner? 
  
1.2 Synopsis of findings 
 The research participant’s pathways into humanitarianism in Jihadist conflict zones 
(Figure 4) revealed two disagreeable findings with the radicalization literature. First was the 
centrality of contingency during the nascent stage of their trajectory, particularly within their 
broader social networks during times of personal and political upheaval, as opposed to 
descriptive risk factors such as group dynamics, ideology, moral outrage or grievances (ex. 
relative deprivation, social alienation or assaults against the Ummah [through foreign policy 
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affronts]). Therefore, this article distinguishes the radicalization process from the 
radicalization pathway - the former being a later component of the latter.  
Second was the significance of mere involvement; participating in the generative 
activities which define this humanitarian community of practice allowed for constructive 
socialization by prototypical group members. This impacted upon the research participant’s 
perception and paved the way for an aligned positive (social) identity based on a positive 
cause which inoculated the research participants from engaging in and justifying violence. 
Therefore, the article recommends that governments buttress alternative cause(s) which 
people can benevolently radicalize for and build an (partial) identity around (primary 
prevention) rather than countering extremism through at-risk individuals (secondary 
prevention). 
Research participants were neither initially nor primarily motivated to act by the oft 
ascribed risk factors. If anything, they drifted into aid (see also: della Porta, 2006). However, 
risk factors did play a prominent role post involvement; close-knit groups and personal 
loyalties were formed. Discussions were had and topics revolved round injustices, geopolitics, 
British foreign policy and what Muslims are to do about it all. Emotions ran high, but they 
were positively channelled.2 Indeed, when asked in interview why they engage in high risk 
humanitarianism for plighted Muslims, answers paralleled that of the radicalization literature: 
moral outrage, feeling obliged to “do” something about injustices, being a good Muslim by 
doing the right thing etc. Yet upon detailing their pathway into this community of practice, a 
“how” rather than “why” approach (Horgan, 2014, pp.87-90), the tertiary role of these factors 
in the initial stages of the pathway was revealed. This raises two points: 
1. Had their happenstance encounters been malign, the socialization process which 
followed involvement would have fuelled rather than tempered these same arguments, thereby 
negatively channelling them for potentially hostile purposes. Indeed, the same situational 
                                                 
2 Anger can be channelled to violence (Holt et al., 2015, p.109; Ranstorp, 2010, p.6; Sageman, 2008 and 
2017c) - an intuitive sequence. But it can also be a “source of social progress” (Byrne, 2016, p.118) when 
positively channelled (Bartlett, et al., 2010, p.25; Githens-Mazer, 2010a; Peucker and Akbarzadeh, 2014, 
p.136). 
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argument can also be applied vice versa i.e. under different circumstances those engaged in 
malevolent behaviours may have engaged in different, even positive, ones (Byrne, 2016, 
p.118; Dutton, 2013, pp.9-10; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, p.68; Reich, 2009, p.40; 
Schmid, 2013a, p.28; Zimbardo, 2007, p.301). As one research participant noted, “Their 
(Jihadists) lives went this way and my life went that way and it’s a thin line between the two” 
(WQB121). 
2. A further consequence of critically appraising risk factors lays in establishing when 
the radicalization pathway (rather than the radicalization process) actually commences: is 
moral outrage (or any other [combination of] risk factors) truly the initial impetus or were 
more arbitrary factors at play before the outrage resonated?3 Even if explicitly stated in 
interview, such risk factor ascriptions may in fact be post-involvement rationalizations as 
similarly remarked upon by others (Byrne, 2016, p.107; Coolsaet, 2016, p.21; Roy, 2017b). 
 Although the counterfactual prohibits both points from being definitively answered, 
scholarly investigation can still address them. This article proposes to do so by selecting a 
demographic who are similar to British Jihadists (see section 3.3), but who followed a 
different pathway, yet one which nonetheless retains relevance for contemporary terrorism 
research for two reasons: (1) both humanitarians and Jihadists function in identical theatres of 
conflict under the aegis of Islam while simultaneously stemming from the same British 
counter-cultural recruitment pool and (2) Jihadists and aid workers are frequently conflated 
because Jihadists have used charities as a cover to enter Jihadist conflict zones (Shanahan, 
2018). Indeed, there is a well-documented overlap between Islamic charities and Jihadist 
groups (Anonymous, 2003, pp. 39-40; Casciani, 2014; Fergusson, 2017, pp.46-51; Kaplan, 
2001; Korteweg et al., 2010, pp. 35-36; Nesser, 2015, p.261; Pisoiu, 2014, pp.772-773; 
Wiktorowicz, 2002, p.197), particularly in the UK (Maher, 2013; Rudd, 2017). 
                                                 
3 Despite the size of risk factor based radicalization models/frameworks/metaphors, examples of indefinite 
factors influencing a budding pathway have been discussed in the literature. These include “chance encounters” 
(Malthaner, 2017, p.645; Pantucci, 2015, p.15; Sageman, 2004, p.121; Schuurman, 2017; Vidino, Marone and 
Entennmann, 2017, p.96), “coincidence” (Nesser, 2015, p.295), “contingency” (Jaskoski, Wilson and Lazareno, 
2017, p.2; Marsden, 2017c, p.103) and “cognitive opening” (Wiktorowicz, 2005, p.20) - the latter is also 
understood as “openness to engagement” (Horgan, 2014, p.101) and “unfreezing” (McCauley and Moskalenko, 
2011, p.80).  
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1.3 Implications 
The article makes one overarching argument: benevolently radicalized Muslims may 
present a potential means of ensuring that people are prevented from commencing the 
malevolent pathway by offering an attractive and prosocial alternative to terrorism.4 
Therefore, structuring the environment so as to buttress the benevolently radicalized is posited 
as an effective preventative approach as involvement builds resistance to violent extremism 
(resilience) through the benevolent radicalization process (constructive socialization) while 
simultaneously stacking the odds in favour of more people having benevolent fortuitous 
encounters.5 In this sense, the benevolently radicalized become market competitors of 
malevolently radicalized groups, particularly given the socio-demographic similarities 
between both groups (see section 3.3).  
To make this argument, radicalization is conceptualized as a vector (it can result in 
malevolent or benevolent outcomes) and the process is definitionally hinged on mobilization 
rather than extremism and/or terrorism by means of Githens-Mazer’s (2010, p.5) definition of 
radicalization: “a collectively defined, individually felt moral obligation to participate in 
direct action” (see section 2.7 for further explanation). As the concept of radicalization is 
blighted by inconsistencies, the literature review section commences with a vignette which is 
constructed to clarify what is (not) meant by radicalization. In so doing, it also briefly covers 
the concepts shortcomings. 
 
1.4 Organization of Article 
The literature review argues that conceiving of radicalization as a vector allows 
research to remain process-centric without being shackled by conditional outcome restrictions 
                                                 
4 The credibility of humanitarianism being a moral equivalent and effective alternative is established by the fact 
that research participants are consistently interviewed by security service personnel at British airports prior to 
departure (Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act) while simultaneously being approached by Prevent staff in order to 
join forces. As one research participant remarked, “Like, what the hell? I wish they’d make up their bloody 
minds about us” (SHB 987 during a coincidental meeting with the author at Frankfurt airport [2018]).  
5 A further argument in support of this approach is put forward by Bhui et al. (2012, p.7) who state that “it is 
important to find ways of preventing political moderates or the politically uncommitted in a community from 
developing sympathies for violent extremist ideologies based on perceived attacks on their religion or identity 
group”. See also footnote 8. 
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i.e. researching the process of radicalization, but only when it results in extremism and/or 
terrorism. It argues that particular typologies can be prevented from embarking on malevolent 
pathways by encouraging involvement with benevolently radicalized groups. In other words, 
the preventive approach proffered here does not prohibit radicalization nor does it directly 
tackle extremism. Rather the opposite: it encourages people to radicalize, but only in a 
benevolent manner as benevolently radicalized groups compete with destructive movements 
by providing a constructive (and inoculating) alternative. This is followed by the methodology 
section which outlines what constructivist grounded theory is and why it was used as well as 
providing further details on the research participants and the research design. The results 
section provides a composite way-point map depicting decisions made based on events 
experienced and illustrates the role of contingency and mere involvement in determining the 
outcome vector. This model is then contrasted to various other radicalization models in order 
to establish empirical validity and is followed by the discussion section which outlines 
shortcomings and suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 What is (Not) Radicalization? 
A few years before 9/11, a group was started by six young men. Five of them were under 23 
years old when this group was conceived and four of them were immigrants to the West. Four 
of them constructed functioning bombs while in high school and all were considered (slightly) 
eccentric by their peers. They found each other through social networks, bonded and retracted 
from society by sequestering themselves from non-essential social contact. With no mediating 
outside influence beyond computer screens, their cognitive horizons narrowed and the group 
polarized. Self-categorization followed with outsiders referring to them as the mafia. But it 
was their countercultural panache, subversive social identity and passionate sense of purpose 
which attracted others; they fervently believed “that small groups of people bound together by 
a sense of mission could change the world” (xxxxx, 2014, p.10). The group eventually grew 
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to 19 people. As their milieu rapidly radicalized, they operationalized their mission and 
developed an extreme commitment to their cause - a cause they worked obsessively on and 
one they knew would cause significant change. Post 9/11, having succeeded in their mission, 
these 19 individuals hit global headlines. One of its members recalled his insider experience: 
“…members hang out only with other members. They ignore their families and 
abandon the outside world. In exchange, they experience strong feelings of belonging, 
and maybe get access to esoteric ‘truths’ denied to ordinary people” (xxxxx, 2014, 
p.124).  
 
The various factors at play here sound all too familiar to radicalization researchers. One may 
even assume that this was the metamorphosis of a budding terrorist group replete with cultic 
characteristics. But these were not vulnerable, angry, negatively socialized nor misinformed 
individuals and their organization was not an underground one. They were not mobilizing 
against a government, a (foreign) policy, a (perceived) injustice, a historical wrong nor the 
society which hosted them and they were not acting in defence of themselves or others. 
Indeed, their guiding principles were neither grievance based nor religiously orientated. That 
their group size was the same as the number of 9/11 hijackers is as coincidental as the timing. 
Instead, the news channels they featured on were financial and the reason for their primetime 
debut was their acquisition by eBay. Both quotes are from angel investor Peter Thiel (2014). 
This was the formation of PayPal. 
 
2.2 Did PayPal Radicalize? 
While PayPal was neither violent nor political, the mechanisms and dynamics 
apparent within the “mafia” were, despite the ideological disparity, congruent to those 
inherent with politically violent organizations, as similarly remarked upon by others 
(Schwerin in McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, p.216; Kruglanski, Jasko, Cherniko, Dugas 
and Weber, 2017, p.222; Wiktorowicz, 2005, p.210). Focussing solely on their socialization, 
it could be argued that PayPal radicalized but this is circumvented by ascribing to the view 
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that radicalization is only radicalization when it results in extremism and/or terrorism. The 
trouble in doing so is that the scholarly consensus lays with the (socialization) process of 
radicalization, not its postulated outcomes (Al-Lami, 2009, p.2; Maskaliūnaitė, 2015, p.12; 
Ramakrisha, 2016a, p.151). In other words, radicalization should not be defined by 
predetermined outcomes - what McCauley and Moskalenko (2017, p.217) have termed as 
“hypothetical intent”. 
The problem is, without establishing some sort of outcome benchmark, any 
socialization process defined through particular characteristics could potentially be labelled as 
radicalization and this serves no identifiable purpose for understanding pathways toward (and 
away from) Jihadism. Therefore, this article adds a caveat to Githens-Mazer’s definition by 
clarifying that “direct action” is specified as mobilizing “in extremis” (James, 1906, p.3). 
Unlike the PayPal mafia, the research participants would be considered radicalized because, 
post involvement and socialization, they voluntarily functioned in (very) high risk areas of 
operation and repeatedly exposed themselves to life threatening situations. 
 
2.3 The Cognitive-to-Behavioural Paradigm 
A further consequence of defining radicalization through specific behavioural 
outcomes rather than cognitions is that extremism (sans mobilization) would also disqualify 
as radicalization. This parallels those who advocate for differentiating radicalization of 
opinion from radicalization of action (Borum, 2011; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017; 
Neumann, 2013) and is supported by research illustrating that people do not necessarily 
become terrorists based on well-developed convictions alone (McCauley and Moskalenko, 
2011; Sageman, 2008).6 Instead, the scholarly consensus is that the process is complex and 
individualized. Subsequently, the sequential movement from extremism to terrorism has been 
brought into question (Kundnani, 2015a, p.288; Sageman, 2016, p.106; Sedgewick, 2010, 
p.490), partly because attempts designed to “change behaviour by changing attitudes often 
fail” (Myers, 2010, p.125). 
                                                 
6 Interestingly, the same is true of the pro-life movement (Munson, 2008). 
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2.4 What Does This Mean for Countering Jihadist Terrorism? 
There are two schools of thought in preventing terrorism; problem-based approaches 
and strengths-based approaches (ex. the Good Lives Model or Positive Deviance). The former 
is the most popular and it identifies causal variables and addresses them in various ways. For 
example, where ideology is identified as a root cause (as is often the case), counter-extremism 
follows. Yet as section 2.3 clarified, countering Islamist ideology in the hope of preventing 
terrorism is not a sound preventative strategy (Horgan, 2014, p.84; Kundnani, 2015b, p.8). 
Rather than attempting to rid society of noxious ideologies, what is proposed as more 
achievable and realistic is the introduction of better ideas7 which can effectively compete with 
malevolent ones (see: Staub, 2013, pp.343-352). This would function by providing a sense of 
(social) identity which transcends the parochialism of extremism while ensuring that 
adherents stay within the societal fold. 
This would entail getting people involved with groups who are prosocial (morally 
opposed to violence) and constructively engaged in theatres where Jihadists are destructively 
engaged; attractive alternatives in the form of humanitarianism. This is slightly at odds with 
the UK’s Prevent and Channel programs which only begin functioning once an individual has 
been identified as potentially vulnerable to violent extremism.8 Nonetheless, engaging with 
benevolent groups fulfils many of the same motivating factors for engaging in terrorism, 
whether that be the various risk factors9 (bar the desire to engage in violence) or more 
nebulous variables such as a cognitive opening followed by a chance encounter,10 but realized 
in a positive manner.11 
                                                 
7 As Fernandez (in Cottee, 2015), the former coordinator for the Centre for Strategic Counterterrorism 
Communications, states: “We don’t have a counter-narrative. We have a half message: ‘Don’t do this’, but we 
lack the ‘Do this instead’”. Benevolent Radicalization is presented here as a viable “Do this instead” option. 
8 The reason for casting such a wide net and getting people involved beyond those merely described as “at risk” 
or “vulnerable to (violent) extremism” is best described by the public health approach presented by Bhui et al.. 
(2012, pp.3-4): “population level reductions in characteristics (or behaviours) that carry a small individual risk 
for a particular illness lead to greater reductions in the overall prevalence of that illness, when compared with 
interventions on very few people who are identified as carrying a very high risk”.  
9 Whether that be adventure, sense of belonging or purpose, alleviating suffering, doing the right thing, being a 
good Muslim etc. 
10 Other explanations include the frustration of basic human needs such as the need to feel secure, to have 
control, to have a positive identity, to be connected to others while retaining autonomy, to understand the world 
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Furthermore, government support for benevolent groups would downplay any jujitsu 
politics because adherents would be empowered by having the opportunity to act on their faith 
aligned affect. It is for this reason that Kundnani (2015a, p.15) states that “radicalization in 
the true sense of the word is the solution, not the problem.” Indeed, that radicalization can 
have benevolent outcomes and that terrorism can be militated through attractive alternatives 
are not new concepts. What is novel is their combination. 
 
2.5 Theorizing Benevolent Radicalization 
Numerous publications have articulated that the same radicalization process which 
creates malevolent outcomes can also lead to benevolent ones (Canadian Government, 2009, 
p.1; Dearey, 2010, p.29; Githens-Mazer, 2009, p.19; Kundnani, 2015a, p.15; Thompson, 
2011, p.195 in Ramakrisha, 2016a, p.152; Venhaus, 2011). For example, Lakhani (2014, p.2) 
notes that radicalization is perceived as negative but “it can in essence be thought of as either 
pro-social … or anti-social”. Providing evidence of this, McCauley and Moskalenko (2011, 
p.215) note that their radicalization mechanisms may be of use in understanding pathways to 
prosocial groups such as the NGO Doctors Without Borders because “the process is amoral in 
the sense that radicalization can occur for causes both good and bad” (McCauley and 
Moskalenko, 2011, p.4). 
Similar analyses have been proffered by others: 
1. Wiktorowicz (2005, in Kundnani 2015b, p.21) states that “the social psychological 
process by which individuals become active in radical Islamist groups is not all that different 
from moderate, non-violent Muslim groups or from non-Islamic social movements, even if 
the content of the ideology differs.” 
                                                                                                                                                        
and our role in it (Staub, 1989). Similarly, albeit more specified, are the 11 primary goods as identified by Purvis 
(2010): life, knowledge, play, work, agency, inner peace, relatedness, community, spirituality, pleasure and 
creativity.  
11 This does not mean to suggest that the UK should encourage British Muslims to mobilize in extremis by 
deploying to Iraq or Syria. Rather, the socialization process of getting them involved in effectively helping 
Muslims in blighted areas would ensure that they become inoculated to pro-violence arguments due to "path 
dependence”, particularly when engaged early in their trajectory (Pierson in Jaskoski et al., 2017, p.14). 
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2. Sunstein (2009, p.149), in his exploration of the social psychological mechanisms 
which lead to groups going to extremes, notes that “The American Revolution, the civil rights 
movement, and the fall of both communism and apartheid had everything to do with 
mechanisms of the sort sketched here”. This is why he further notes that when “people shift 
from indifference to intense concern with local problems, such as poverty and crime”, then 
“extreme movements are good, even great”.12 
3. In such instances, Sarma (2017, p.279) notes that non-violent radicalization “is 
often the fulcrum of societal growth” and for this reason Jackson (2011) states that “in some 
cases…it might actually be socially desirable to radicalize people, and more of them.” 
 
2.6 Attractive Alternatives to Terrorism 
Effective alternatives (in varying forms) have been postulated to militate violent 
extremism by numerous scholars (Atran 2010, p.224 and pp.290-291; El-Badawy, Comerford 
and Welby, 2015, p.7; Frey and Luechinger, 2002; Kundnani, 2015a, p.15 and p.199; Malet, 
2009, pp.113-114; Marsden, 2017a; Neumann, 2016, p.182; O’Gorman, 2011, p.71; Sageman, 
2008, p. 117; Schimd, 2013a, p.49; Sitter, 2013, p.11; Venhaus, 2010, pp.11-15). However, 
none of these are predicated on the hypothesis of providing a positive cause to radicalize for 
because that would be conceptually impossible given the malevolent-only confines of 
contemporary conceptualizations of radicalization (see footnote 7). Nonetheless, as the 
following section details, conceiving of radicalization as a vector allows for the theoretical 
possibility of utilizing benevolent radicalization as a means of offsetting malevolent 
radicalization particularly because, as noted by Sitter (2013, p.10), “civil society groups [such 
as aid groups] are often in direct competition with extremist elements for the hearts and minds 
of marginalized and disadvantaged elements of society”.   
 
 
 
                                                 
12 It must be noted that “extreme” and “radical” are often used interchangeably in the literature.  
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2.7 Radicalization as a Vector 
What distinguishes speed (a scalar quantity) from velocity (a vector) is directionality; 
3 km/h as opposed to 3 km/h on a north easterly bearing. Therefore, while both speed and 
velocity provide a magnitude quantity (speed), a vector also indicates a heading. For the 
purposes of radicalization, this would be a malevolent or benevolent bearing. This distinction 
is important because the scalar-centric assumption is that successful radicalization is solely a 
question of magnitude; above a hazily defined “speed” and one is classified as a terrorist 
and/or extremist.  
However, in order for radicalization to be conceptualized as a vector, the central 
defining construct requires sufficient vagueness so as to be both consistent as well as 
accommodating to other potential outcomes. Mobilization achieves this by eschewing specific 
actions taken when mobilized in global Jihadist conflict zones i.e. mobilizing to a specific 
theatre does not specify which actions were engaged in. Therefore, in order to incorporate 
mobilization as the central defining construct of radicalization, this paper utilized Githens-
Mazer’s (2010, p.5) definition as it artfully avoids specificity of action in theatre while also 
being mobilization-centric through its outcome of “direct action” which, in this article, is 
clarified as mobilizing “in extremis” (James, 1906, p.3) i.e. voluntarily mobilizing to a high-
risk theatre. 
A further requirement for conceptualizing radicalization as a vector are the bearings 
themselves. These require consistent specificity in order to elucidate the subtleties of the 
defining construct (mobilization) i.e. whether one engages in positive or negative behaviours 
when mobilized in theatre. Benevolence achieves this as it stipulates the specific and 
consistent actions taken when mobilized. In this case, humanitarianism without engaging in 
any malevolent behaviours.13 
                                                 
13 Malevolence as a bearing is less clear-cut as it may not be consistent: one may engage in violence while also 
engaging in positive behaviours (albeit solely for ones in-group). Furthermore, in terms of radicalization to 
“homegrown” terrorism, mobilizing in extremis (“direct action”) would also not elucidate any relevant 
information as the potential assailant would not be crossing international boundaries to a conflict zone. 
Therefore, with the malevolent bearing either known or suspected, defining mobilization in extremis in this 
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It is this contrast between definitional construct (mobilization to global Jihadist 
conflict zones) and bearing (benevolently mobilized in global Jihadist conflict zones) which 
brings clarity and a practical nuance to understandings of radicalization unobtainable with 
most definitions of radicalization because their defining constructs (terrorism and/or 
extremism) are overly specified. Defining radicalization in such a reflexive manner challenges 
normative assessments of radicalization (radicalization is always a net-negative) and this 
duality is at the heart of terrorism studies given the context and perceiver dependent “terrorist 
or freedom fighter” cliché. 
 Despite numerous researchers having theorized on the potential upside of 
radicalization (see section 2.5), the radicalization hypothesis does not account for these; it 
only accounts for negativity (terrorists/extremists) and neutrality (everyone else). As 
radicalization is not perceived as a vector, positivity is not incorporated and countering it 
subsequently favours a problem-based approach. A change of perception is required in order 
for strength-based accounts to become a viable means of preventing malevolence and this is 
encapsulated within the research question: how does one mobilize to Jihadist conflict zones in 
a benevolent rather than a malevolent manner? Utilizing archetypical amalgams, Figure 1 
illustrates that the research question seeks to differentiate Batman from the Joker, not the 
Joker (negativity) from Joe Public (neutrality) as is the norm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
“homegrown” instance would use indicative factors such as the purchase of a weapon system or specific 
chemical components for explosive ordnance construction. 
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Figure 1 Mobilized Moral Vectors vs. Joe Public 
 
Batman Joker Joe Public 
Hero Villain Bystander 
Positive Deviant Negative Deviant Conformist 
Love Hate Indifferent 
Heal Harm Incapable 
Good Bad Innocuous 
  
It is therefore no surprise that Prevent is viewed so negatively within British Muslim 
communities: it inadvertently says “the best a Muslim can be is innocuous” – hence their 
socially securitized status. Radicalization should be expanded so that Muslims who cross the 
decisional line from non-mobilized to mobilized are not immediately shoehorned into the 
negative “Joker” status (see footnote 7). Subsequently, when radicalization is conceptualized 
as a vector, Batman (the research participants) and the Joker (Jihadists) become the “moral 
equivalents” (James, 1906) of each other and Joe Public the opposite of both because, using 
Githens-Mazer definition, Joe Public is not mobilized.  
 
2.8 Militating Malevolent Radicalization through Benevolent Radicalization 
Militating violent extremism through the promotion of a prosocial cause would 
involve a policy devoted to structuring the environment so as to encourage benevolent 
radicalization more generally or nudge particular typologies off the malevolent path; an 
identity based means of mobilization for a glorious, noble and impactful cause with 
significant others and one which recaptures Islam back from the Jihadists. This, loosely, is 
what Schmid (2013a, p.28) would refer to as “social engineering” and requires (a) recognizing 
that radicalization is a vector (i.e. a hammer can be utilized as a destructive weapon or a 
constructive tool [Barrett, 2017, p.135; Elshimi, 2017, p.10]) and (b) setting the scene for its 
constructive rather than destructive use. This would involve “an activist identity” (Ferguson, 
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McDaid and McAuley, 2017, pp.13-14) which can be mobilized in positive ways and thereby 
“channelled into productive life paths” (Atran, Axelrod, Davies and Fischoff, 2017, p.354). 
Subsequently, buttressing benevolently radicalized groups in order to assist them gaining 
adherents’ offers a viable alternative to terrorism but is only likely to appeal to particular 
typologies of “potentials”. 
 
2.9 Typologies 
Various scholars have (empirically) categorized Jihadists or foreign fighters into 
numerous typologies based on their pathway, role and/or motivation. However, only some of 
these typologies would qualify as being receptive to the possibility of becoming involved with 
benevolently radicalized groups as others may simply want to be Jihadists (Lakhani, 2013, 
p.56; Roy, 2017a, p.2) or engage in violence. What follows are a list of the receptive 
typologies: 
1. McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2014) “caring-compelled”: these people are affected 
by suffering and feel personally responsible in reducing it. This motivation can be adequately 
addressed by benevolent groups. 
2. Khosrokhavar’s (2009) “existential man”. State buttressed benevolently radicalized 
groups would be able to bridge the multiple identity gap these people experience and replace 
it with a sense of pride which constructively combines their religion with their nationality. 
3. Nesser’s (2015) “misfits” and “drifters”. These typologies would find a sense of 
belonging and develop an aligned social identity through involvement, but this need not 
necessarily be through benevolently radicalized groups. It should be noted that, in many ways, 
the prototypical group members who socialized the research participants (or “proteges” in 
Nesser’s typology) bear striking similarities to Nesser’s “entrepreneurs” albeit on a morally 
opposed level. 
4. Neumann’s (2016) “defenders” seem to come closest to describing the research 
participants as they too (initially at least) deployed for charitable purposes. The difference is 
that the defenders did not leave the conflict zone and became radicalized by it whereas the 
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research participants only remain in theatre for a maximum of ten days before returning to the 
UK. 
5. Venhaus’s (2011) “identity seeker”. Similar to Nesser’s (2015) “misfits” and 
“drifters”, this typology is primarily attracted by the need of belonging to a group rather than, 
initially at least, being ideologically loyal. 
 
 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Development of the Research Agenda 
The original plan was to interview grassroots British Muslim aid workers who 
function solely and consistency in a humanitarian capacity in areas commonly referred to as 
Jihadist conflict zones in Syria and Iraq. Research questions intended to address their 
decision-making processes and justifications while mobilized in areas where violence is 
condoned and normalized. In other words, “why not engage in violence?” Results would then 
be contrasted with publicly available information on British Jihadists operational in the same 
theatres and (violent) extremism more generally so as to delineate the argumentative contours 
of violent vis-à-vis non-violent extremism. 
As both groups function in areas under Jihadist control, thereby operational under the 
aegis of Jihadist groups, the working assumption was that both aid workers and Jihadists 
would lay somewhere on an extremist continuum and that the Jihadists would be more 
doctrinaire. However, the assumption that only extremists would travel from the UK in order 
to function in Jihadist areas of operation were roundly false (see Figure 2) and the trajectories 
the research participants took to become aid workers in these locales raised questions about 
the process and outcomes of radicalization rather than extremism as initially envisioned. 
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Therefore, research proceeded with a focus on how the research participants became high risk 
aid workers and, counter-intuitively, this had clear overtures to the radicalization literature. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
Constructivist grounded theory methodology (Charmaz, 2006) was selected because 
its philosophical underpinnings are well aligned to the explorative nature of the research, the 
“how” and “process” centric nature of the research question and the data-led as opposed to 
theory informed analysis. It aims to generate participant led data which is abstracted to form a 
theory or framework. Indeed, methodological approaches in the field of terrorism and 
radicalization are, more often than not, discipline led rather than problem-centric. Therefore, 
research tends to be bound by subject matter expertise instead of adopting a holistic approach. 
And for good reason; interdisciplinary approaches are academically eclectic and integrating 
these into a coherent narrative is an astoundingly difficult task. However, a manageable 
means of doing so is by way of grounded theory as the literature review is determined by data 
rather than shaped by conceptual framework. 
But this “data first, literature review later” design does not mean entering the data 
collection phase as a blank slate (Martin, 2006, p.47; McCallin, 2006, p.14; Urquhart and 
Fernandez, 2006, pp.459-460). Instead, research is conducted with “an open mind, not an 
empty head” (Bryant, 2017, p.219) because it is not bound by predetermined theories (De Bie 
and Poot, 2016, p.583). In other words, a preliminary and non-committal literature review was 
performed prior to data collection and the results directed further reading. 
 
3.3 Research Sample 
Initial data sampling began with British Muslims who were engaged in humanitarian 
activities. Purposive sampling then focussed on those who focussed (largely) on Jihadist 
conflict zones14 and finally theoretical sampling honed in on those who mobilized in-person 
as opposed to the majority who raise funds and freight supplies to location or those who raise 
                                                 
14 These people did not specialize in Jihadist conflict zones because they were Jihadist. Rather, these were the 
theatres with (often) the most suffering and they were selected out of urgency. 
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funds and drive aid to bordering countries which is then picked up by previously established 
contacts and brought by land to those in need. Unlike other methodologies, the sampling 
process in grounded theory does not count the initial and purposive samples because these are 
used to arrive at the final sample. Therefore, while the sample in this study is indeed small, a 
far larger number was utilized in order to obtain the theoretical sample. Finally, given the 
intuitive equation of 
British Muslim + Jihadist Conflict Zone = Terrorist 
only a small number were prepared to be interviewed. Therefore, the sample (n=6), while not 
unique in terms of British Muslim (historical) responses to global humanitarian catastrophes, 
cannot be confirmed as representative. But neither is it intended to be; the value of this paper 
lays in resultant conceptualizations and a new avenue for Countering Violent Extremism 
based on a small number of successful outliers who are, by definition, never representative; 
positive deviants as opposed to negative deviants. 
All research participants were in their mid-twenties to early thirties, of second 
generation Pakistani descent and were educated to secondary school level. Each made 
between five and fifteen deployments to Jihadist conflict zones over (approximately) the last 
four years lasting between seven and ten days where the majority of aid provided was food or 
medical based. This sample share numerous characteristics with Jihadists: 
• Jihadists are presumed to arise from an amorphous social scene (Hemmingsen, 2010 
in Nilson, 2015, p.344; Lindauer, 2012; Neumann, 2016, p.112; Sageman, 2017a, 
p.12; Schmid, 2013a, p.10; Wali, 2011, p.245). Indeed, research participants stem 
from the same countercultural recruitment pool given their backgrounds (see [WQB 
121 in] section 1.2). 
• Both are Muslims (at least superficially) in locally networked kin groups with no 
prior experience of their future “occupation”, but introduced to it in stages. 
• Like Jihadists, the research participants would, more often than not, also be 
considered “youth” (Atran, Axelrod, Davies and Fischoff, 2017, p.354) with previous 
law enforcement encounters (mainly petty crime and gang related activities) - a 
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characteristic typical of the current wave of Jihadists (see, for example: Basra, 
Neumann and Brunner, 2016). 
• Both were also affected by watching videos of Syrian and Iraqi conflict zones. These 
took the form of “triggering events” (Sageman, 2017b, p.33) rather than “key events” 
(Sageman, 2017b, p.39) and both groups upload their own videos onto social media 
from theatre. 
• The research participants intention was to “do the right thing” and this finding has 
also been documented within the terrorism literature (Bartlett et al., 2010, pp.30-31; 
Bloom, 2016; Fernandez in Cottee, 2015; Marsden, 2017b; UNOCT, 2017, p.33). 
• Both groups are also largely self-funded and committed to a consciously perilous 
cause located within Jihadist conflict zones after departing the UK in kin groups. 
 
The author ensured to the best of his ability that none of the research participants were 
extremists. To do so, the literature on extremism was consulted and risk factors and indicators 
thereof were compiled and contrasted to data. This resulted in Figure 2 which portrays a 
wholly non-extremist stance. The author also confirmed this by triangulating data: an 
extensive search of their social media profiles did not reveal any connection with or 
endorsement of any extremist organizations nor armed groups. Instead, their profiles and 
social network connections revealed contacts with known peaceful community figures and 
their numerous postings were wholly confirmatory of their humanitarian stance. Furthermore, 
the segment of the dissertation not presented in this article are the interviews which were 
conducted with various organizations and community figures working in the field of 
preventing violent extremism (with and without government assistance). All confirmed their 
non-violent/extremist dispositions, beliefs and behaviours. 
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Figure 2 Vulnerability to Extremist Checklist 
Political - Research Participants vote (Labour) 
- Publically endorse others to vote 
- Critical of British Foreign Policy but do not view it as a war against 
Islam 
- Do not support (violent) extremist groups. Rather, they were targeted by 
Daesh with an armed drone in Mosul (among other attacks) 
- Displayed a nuanced and detailed understanding of the politics of the 
region. As such, they understood that politics rather than violence will 
bring wars to an end. They view their role as assisting the civilians (the 
victims) until normalcy is restored  
Social - Publically endorse International Women’s Day 
- Do not believe in the social segregation of men and women 
- Do not view women as subservient 
- Are not hostile to non-Islamic practices or people i.e. they display an 
affinity for understanding others. As such: 
- Enjoy a wide circle of non-Muslim friends and acquaintances jokingly 
referred to as “our clean shaven brothers” (ABM 818) 
- Avid supporters of football (Liverpool in particular) 
Religious - View the Hijab as a personal preference 
- Adopt a human-centric stance to their religion 
-  Nothing stated in interviews would be characterized as inflammatory or 
hateful 
- Two research participants make rap videos and these are endorsed by 
their social network on social media 
Psychological - Did not display cognitive rigidity (black and white thinking) 
- Frequently made reference to humour, particularly self-depreciating humour 
i.e. well-socialized and non-confrontational behaviour  
  
 
 
 
 
Ken Reidy: Radicalization as a Vector 
 
 
 
 
269 
- Did not display unmet aspirations or personal injustices. Rather, 
empowerment, joy and a sense of belonging were displayed 
-  Are not socially isolated 
- Did not display mental health problems (however, the author is not a clinician) 
- Did not display low self-esteem 
- They have experienced discrimination (see risk factors), but they do not brood 
over or nurse those wounds. To explain this, “us” and “them” descriptions were 
used. But this was not placed in the risk factors because they described 
themselves as the out-group (“them”) and felt empowered to address their 
“them” status. As such, they invited a prominent member of the EDL (English 
Defence League – a British far right group) for “tea and a chat” when he visited 
their area to protest. He refused the offer 
- Did not display identity confusion or identity conflict 
- Healthy relationship with their family. This was not always the case as the first 
point in the risk factors clarifies 
Risk Factors - Previous criminal involvement 
- Previous experience with racism/discrimination  
- Current travel outside of UK to locations associated with extremist 
activity 
 
 
3.4 Data Collection 
After obtaining ethical consent, data collection was conducted by face-to-face 
interview and took place between 2016 and 2017. Questions from semi-structured interviews 
revolved around (1) delineating how the research participants became involved in aid, (2) 
what coping mechanisms they utilized when faced with the inevitable human devastation they 
encountered and (3) how their community views them and their actions. Each question 
intended to address different facets. For the first, it was to establish their pathway into impact 
philanthropy. These were subsequently contrasted with what is known about Jihadist 
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trajectories. For the second, it was to establish how the research participants stayed in role as 
humanitarians (specific strategies or coping mechanisms) rather than succumbing to emotion 
and moral outrage which is documented to precipitate violent responses.15 The third intended 
to probe how the British Muslim community viewed their efforts. This is important because 
negative community responses would have critical implications for recommendations 
stemming from the research and would be evident in their donations (their only source of 
income).16 
 Initial coding was used to assign labels and all levels of analysis were constantly 
compared. Select labels were subsequently abstracted to focused and theoretical coding which 
drove analysis towards category development and these, once saturated, led to the 
construction of (and explanation for) their pathway into impact philanthropy in global Jihadist 
conflict zones (see Figure 3). Results from this process guided the literature review where 
radicalization, under an expanded hypothesis, was used as the means of categorizing 
involvement. 
 
Figure 3 Sample Coding Process 
Raw Data (Summary) Initial Coding Focussed Coding Theoretical Coding 
Q: How did you get 
involved? 
A: A friend asked me 
to join him on a trip. 
 
Mobilizing as a favour 
through social network 
 
 
The factors which 
commence one’s 
mobilization may not 
be the same as those 
which sustain 
mobilizations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q: Why did you 
agree? 
A: It sounded good. 
Better than what I was 
 
Mobilizing as a better 
alternative (short and 
long term) 
                                                 
15 Indeed, this is precisely how numerous “formers” who currently function in preventing violent extremism 
radicalized to violent extremism. For example, Nawaz (2017) of Quilliam Foundation stated during one of his 
podcasts, “…when the genocide happened in Serbia against Bosnian Muslims, I got so angry I got radicalized.” 
While not presented in this paper, emotion was revealed to play a significant role in radicalization.  
16 At the time of writing, research participants have initiated long-term projects (read: more expensive) alongside 
more immediate aid relief. Therefore, one can assume that the community remain supportive.  
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doing then. I slept 
really well after it. 
 
 
 
The process of 
involvement and the 
co-construction 
of identity 
and narrative through 
positive impact 
Q: Did you know it 
was going to feel 
good? 
A: No. Never crossed 
my mind. I thought I 
was doing him a 
favour (by helping him 
out). But he was doing 
me one (but didn’t 
know it). 
 
 
 
 
Mobilizing felt good 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mobilization gives 
instant positive impact 
and influences 
perception 
Q: Is that why you 
went out again? 
A: Yeah sort of. But, 
when you see all that 
bad stuff on TV… I 
saw that for real. 
Different places, same 
suffering. 
And we made an 
instant difference. 
Like, "boom” 
 
 
 
Mobilizing as part of a 
wider narrative of 
suffering and means of 
positive contribution 
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4. Results 
 
4.1 Organization 
This section commences with the research participants pathway into impact philanthropy. It is 
abstracted to a linear model because it is a composite map of decisional way-points.17 In order 
to establish empirical validity for the vector concept, this is subsequently juxtaposed to 
models which begin with generalized forms of grievances (Silber and Bhatt, 2007; Precht, 
2007; Wiktorowicz, 2005) rather than specific ones (Moghaddam, 2005; Sageman, 2017b) 
because the research participants did not commence their vector with specific goals or 
grievances. It is also not contrasted to later or other frameworks and these are rarely linear. As 
the model has distinct similarities to Wiktorowicz’s (2005), a segment of this section is 
devoted to theorizing how Wiktorowicz’s research participants took a malevolent vector while 
those of this study did not. The overall purpose is to illustrate that so few people engage in 
terrorism because they engage in other impactful activities; attractive alternatives engaged in 
through other communities of practice which are not studied by radicalization researchers 
because they do not fall within the remit of the predetermined successful outcomes of 
radicalization: extremism and/or terrorism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 This is not to suggest that the process itself is linear. Rather, it is presented as linear because it is a composite.  
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4.2 The Benevolent Pathway 
Figure 4 The Benevolently Radicalized Pathway  
 
 
 
Stage 1: Gang Affiliation and Delinquency 
All research participants were involved in a delinquent gang lifestyle involving drugs 
and crime. They felt uncertain as to what they should do and who they wanted to be (see for 
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example, Hogg and Blaylock, 2012). They identified as Muslim, but did not practice Islam; 
their Islamic identity was latent and they were Muslim in name only. Although unstated 
specifically in interviews, there was an element of shame in that they were not living up to the 
breadwinning protector (adult/masculine) ideals of their community and culture. 
 
Stage 2: “What am I doing?” 
All research participants experienced compounding chronic problems in life. Some 
also experienced an acute event which brought this uncertainty to the fore. For these “acutes” 
it built up to the point where they asked themselves “what am I doing?” This either took the 
form of a drug induced epiphany or a pertinent point/realization brought up in conversation. 
In one case, it was a text message where his friends informed him that he “should stay low” 
because the police were looking for him: “Ugh,” OO161 said upon receiving the message, 
“what am I doing?” For the chronic it was a steady barrage of shame, resentment and guilt. 
The “acutes” took matters into their own hands, approached the “chronics” (who were part of 
the same wider social network), and asked them the same question. This resonated because 
either the “acutes” were able to articulate what the “chronics” were thinking/feeling, or 
because following the “acutes” was better than where they were at that particular moment (see 
Question 2 in Figure 3). 
 
Stage 3 and 4: Doing the Right Thing and Making Contact 
“What am I doing?” was followed by “what should I be doing?” Research participants 
turned to Islam because it is understood as unquestionably good i.e. re-establishing an Islamic 
identity is a guaranteed positive. To do so, they forayed back into their community. This was 
a transitional period in their lives and it occurred during a transitional phase in numerous 
Islamic majority countries; the Arab Spring. The conversations they were exposed similarly 
reflected uncertainty; is the Arab Spring good or bad, what will happen etc.? New social 
contacts were developed. Old contacts however were not broken off because the research 
participants did not socially isolate. Indeed, such “total” situations are a key requirement 
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when groups move to extremes (Bandura, 1982, p.751; Meerlo, 1956, p.201; Sunstein, 2009; 
Taylor, 2017; Waller, 2007). 
 
Stage 5: Identity Enactment 
Through serendipitous encounters with grassroots aid workers in their communities, 
zakat (alms giving - comparable to aid) was framed as a means for the research participants to 
progress from being practicing Muslims to becoming operational ones. Islam is practiced in 
accordance with the five pillars; shahada and prayer are practiced daily, fasting is only 
practiced during Ramadan and the Hajj is usually a once in a lifetime experience. Therefore, 
to expand quickly upon their rekindled identity, they took up zakat with gusto and this was 
their formal introduction to the suffering of the Ummah. Some began their humanitarian foray 
with a trip to Calais to help migrants while others went to Greek islands to assist the incoming 
refugees. Suffering was now experienced first-hand and any footage viewed over social media 
platforms became relatable and part of a wider narrative.  
 
Stage 6: Perception Change 
This first-hand behavioural experience generated powerful affect (frustration, anger 
and outrage) and this impacted upon their perception, worldview and self-concept (see, for 
example, Berger and Luckman, 1991). Through positive socialization by prototypical group 
members, this affect was channelled and operationalized where the research participants 
became empowered to have an effect on said suffering (and their own) and this effected their 
burgeoning interpretation of Islam. It was also the first time that they shouldered 
responsibility and they discovered a deeper existential meaning in doing such difficult work. 
In other words, their personal uncertainty was reflected by the uncertainty of the Arab Spring 
and they were able to alleviate both through aid. Furthermore, their beliefs followed their 
behaviour rather than the other way round and was guided by role models while being 
involved in a community of practice. 
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Stage 7: Operational Muslim 
Their identity and worldview were now formally hinged on assisting the oppressed 
and their occupations and/or lifestyles now revolve (to varying degrees) around charity. Their 
prosocial identity now thoroughly embedded, their prognosis of dire situations revolves 
around protecting civilians rather than punishing aggressors and this is how they engage with 
their environment. What is noteworthy is that what initially led the research participants to 
become involved in aid was not what sustained their involvement. Doing the right thing was 
an aspiration, becoming the right person and staying the right person sustains it because that 
identity became valued. 
 
4.3 Juxtaposing Models 
There is an element of overlap with earlier radicalization models which commence 
with generalized grievances or experiences (Figure 4) but not with frameworks which 
commence with specific ones (Moghaddam, 2005; Sageman, 2008; Sageman, 2017b). Given 
space constraints, the following section will focus upon Wiktorowicz’s (2005) model and will 
illustrate how the research participants followed a benevolent path while Wiktorowicz’s 
(2005) did not. 
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Figure 5 Benevolent Radicalization Juxtaposed to Malevolent Radicalization 
 
 
 
Wiktorowicz’s (2005) model has four key stages; cognitive opening, religious seeking, 
frame alignment and socialization. A cognitive opening may take the form of a personal crisis 
and this makes a person receptive to ideas that, under other circumstances, they would not 
have been. This is why the intersection of biographical exposure and the enabling 
  
 
 
 
 
Ken Reidy: Radicalization as a Vector 
 
 
 
 
278 
environment is posited to play a central role in radicalization (Briggs and Silverman, 2014, 
p.23; Schmid, 2013b, p.221; Silke and Brown, 2016, pp.135-136). Religious seeking is an 
extension of this; the individual is guided toward religion or seeks it out. Through discussion, 
the individuals frame aligns with the message and they “realize” that the Islamist worldview 
is congruent to their own. During socialization the individual adopts the ideology and group 
identity which is maintained through constant interaction with the Islamist group and this 
interaction occurs at the expense of other social interactions. Therefore, (progressive) social 
isolation is key (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p.890; Slootman and Tille, 2006, p.90). 
The process of benevolent radicalization, sans isolation, is similar. Wiktorowicz’s 
cognitive opening is well-aligned with the transitional phases the research participants 
experienced in stages 1 to 3. His second stage (religious seeking) may be interpreted as “do 
the right thing” and making contact (stage 4) as all research participants dutifully sought out 
religion within their wider social network. Indeed, doing the right thing has been documented 
as common among those who have left to join violent Islamist groups (Bartlett et al., 2010, 
pp.30-31; Bloom, 2016; Fernandez in Cottee, 2015; Marsden, 2017b; UNOCT, 2017, p.33). 
Wiktoroiwcz’s final two stages (frame alignment and socialization) link stages 4, 5 and 6 in 
so far as the actions of the research participants and how they were guided impacted upon 
what they came to believe about themselves, the world and their role in it. For Wiktorowicz’s 
participants, this resulted in a weaponized identity but for the research participants, it became 
that of a protector. How this occurred is described using Borum’s (2003) heuristic. 
 
4.4 The Terrorist Mindset 
Borum (2003) outlines four stages, the first of which frames an event as “it’s not 
right” (Borum, 2003, p.8). The second stage is comparative and what was identified in stage 
one is viewed as unjust; “it’s not fair”. One may, for example, view the Syrian civil war in 
these terms or the plight of the Rohingya. Stage three targets an out-group (which could also 
be a policy) and blames them for the injustice; “it’s your fault”. This, for example, is relatable 
to Bin Laden’s concept of targeting the far enemy. In the process of doing this, the out-group 
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is vilified and often dehumanized which “facilitate[s] justification for aggression” (Borum, 
2003, p.7). 
Stage four sees a normalization of negative stereotyping which provides the ability to 
assign a moral dispositional quality to all members; “you’re evil”. This process results in the 
justifiable use of violence against the out-group. 
Conceptualizing radicalization as a vector requires a perceptual change of Borum’s 
(2003) model and this is achieved by organizing his stages into diagnostics and prognostics. 
Stage one and two are diagnostic in nature; they delineate the existence of a problem which is 
always defined through the assigning of victimhood. Stage three and four are prognostic in 
nature; they define what needs to be done to alleviate the suffering of the victims. In 
malevolent radicalization, stage one and two are victim based and stage three and four are 
perpetrator based. The research participants of this study similarly diagnosed what the 
problem was. But instead of blaming an out-group for the injustice, their focus remained with 
the victims because the prototypical group members (the archetypes [Sageman, 2017a, 
pp.124-125]) had convinced them that solutions to the intractable problems occurring in 
Jihadist conflict zones occur among political elites and power brokers.18   
 
5. Discussion 
 
5.1 Benevolent Radicalization as Attractive Alternative 
Scholars have questioned why so few people engage in terrorism (Horgan, 2014, p.104; 
Kurzman, 2011, p.7; Taylor, 2010, p.128). This paper attempts an answer by positing that so 
few do so because they engage in other impactful political activities - many of which fall 
outside of the radicalization hypothesis as currently constructed and are therefore 
imperceptible to radicalization researchers. Furthermore, some people want to “do” something 
about perceived wrongs or injustices (Barrett, 2013; Horgan, 2017; Pantucci, 2015, p.13; 
                                                 
18 Bandura (1982, p.751) notes how Diana Oughton’s (a prominent member of the Weathermen) pathway 
towards militancy was equally affected by a prototypical group member who convinced her that only 
revolutionary force would bring the necessary changes. 
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Schuurman, 2017). A pragmatic and legitimate question therefore is: what is an affected, 
Western and “politically awakened” (Brzezinski, 2013, p.26) Sunni to “do” about grievances 
arising from the sectarian cleansing of Sunni’s occurring in Syria and Iraq and the ensuing 
humanitarian crisis?  
Introducing benevolent radicalization into the radicalization hypothesis would allow 
the nation state to craft a policy which would give potential mobilizers a legal and effective 
means to impact upon victims; an attractive alternative. How this would function as an 
alternative is best summed up by Shahar (2015): “Organizations that counter radicalization do 
not try to dampen the attraction of ‘noble causes’; they know the effort would be futile. 
Instead they attempt to substitute a different – less violent – version of the same cause” i.e. a 
morally equivalent version of the same cause. Subsequently, these have been termed as 
“attractive alternatives” (Travis, 2008) or “practical alternatives” (Briggs and Silverman, 
2014, p.24).  
A policy of supporting the benevolently radicalized could be operationalized through 
Positive Deviance. This is a strengths-based approach which is applied to problems requiring 
behavioural and/or social change. Its basic premise is three-fold (1) solutions to seemingly 
intractable problems already exist, (2) they have been discovered by the community and (3) 
these innovators have succeeded even though they share the same constraints and barriers as 
others (Pascale et al., 2014, p.23). Key to this is that they do not necessarily know that they 
have succeeded. It is generally described as inside-out (it uses insiders, not outsiders), 
backward (the solution already exists but just needs to be implemented) and counter-cultural 
(leaders do not bring solutions – they find them in the community and expand their usage).  
Furthermore, it has the lowest perturbation to impact ratio because it turns to solutions 
already proven within the community rather than importing foreign solutions that arouse 
scepticism at best and outright sabotage at worst (Pascale, et al., 2010. p.13). This carries 
extra weight given the consensus on the importance of local community in countering violent 
extremism (Ellis and Abdi, 2017, p.289; Barzegar, Powers and El-Kharhilli, 2016, p.29; 
Schmid, 2013a, p.27) and the importance of credible and trustworthy people who resonate 
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with said community (Barzegar et al., 2016, p.29; Braddock and Horgan, 2016; Braddock and 
Morrison, 2017, p.9) i.e. “epistemic authority” (Kruglanski, et al., 2017, p.220).  
 
5.2 Shortcomings of Benevolent Radicalization as Effective Alternative 
As discussed in section 2.9, benevolent radicalization as attractive alternative is only 
posited to function for particular typologies. This raises the question of agency. In particular, 
do situational factors override innate tendencies (Zimbardo, 2007) or are personality 
characteristics nonetheless the most powerful variables (Staub, 1989). Waller (2007, pp.38-
40) notes that group interactions can function as amplifiers of dispositional preference, what 
Sunstein (2009, pp.53-54) terms as “antecedent convictions”. Similarly, Bandura (1982, 
p.750) notes that one can contribute to their own destiny by developing attributes which 
resonate in particular social milieus. In this sense, there does seem to be a level of agency19 
involved in choosing which group to become a member of i.e. adherents “self-select” (Kirby, 
2007, p.423). Given the role of such dispositional factors, the preventative point of 
interdiction proffered in this paper is not a silver bullet. 
 
5.3 Future Research 
Sageman (2017a, p.108) notes that it would be “unwise to extrapolate from a model 
built on militantly nonviolent subjects to explain the turn to political violence”. This is 
certainly logical, but the problem is he later notes that most politically violent actors, with 
some rare exceptions, “start out explicitly rejecting violence” (Sageman, 2017a, p.144).20 
Assuming that “starting out” means socialization to mobilization, a more nuanced take would 
address why some people mobilized (beyond protest group) to violence while others 
mobilized (beyond protest group) in more constructive ways. Such an approach would 
                                                 
19 This may be a function of early life practices which form the rudimentary components for a positive social 
identity (Staub, 2004, p.68-69). See also, Oliner and Oliner (1998, pp.142-170). This may also be related to the 
literature on dysfunctional families and terrorism (Jenkins, 2007, p.5). 
20 Similarly, Munson (2008, p.6) notes that many pro-life activists began as decidedly pro-choice with “their 
views chang[ing] during the actual process of becoming activists - that is, in the process of becoming 
mobilized”.  
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provide a more granular exploration instead of remaining with the binary end-states of 
successful radicalization (terrorism and/or extremism) - a methodologically limiting and bland 
appraisal of human factors. 
Another potential avenue for future research lays in distinguishing the radicalization 
pathway from the radicalization process. Results from this research indicate that the nascent 
stages of the pathway are characterized by happenstance whereas the radicalization process 
occurred post involvement.21 While most models and frameworks commence at the 
radicalization process stage (raising questions about low base rates), serendipitous meetings 
are nonetheless frequently mentioned throughout the literature (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008, 
pp.10-11; Malthaner, 2017, p.645; Pantucci, 2015, p.15; Sageman, 2004, p.121; Schuurman, 
2017; Vidino, Marone and Entennmann, 2017, p.96).22 These people become role models 
and/or heroes (Coolsaet, 2016, p.24) and their prominence is aided by a lack of other 
(positive) Muslim role models (Byrne, 2016, p.162) and, in many instances, a lack of positive 
role models when growing up (Ramakrishna, 2016b). How serendipitous meetings with 
potential role models proceed and interact may adequately distinguish the radicalization 
process from the pathway and this requires further inquiry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Ironically, Morrison (in Braddock, 2017) noted that many of his “Talking Terror” podcast panellists have 
themselves stumbled into terrorism research after such coincidental contact with an influential researcher - a 
point specifically mentioned by Bandura (1982, p.748). 
22 These relationships become cemented through interpersonal attraction (Bandura, 1982, p.750).  
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